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 This paper has been prepared as part of the Zambia country study of the Macroeconomic 
and Regional Integration in Southern Africa (MERRISA) project and serves as a background 
paper for modeling exercises. The paper focuses on analyzing institutional constraints on the 
development of the agricultural sector in Zambia. It argues that by changing some of the rules and 
neglecting to integrate these changes into the complete institutional setting, policymakers have 
been unable to achieve their goals. Other constraints on Zambia's agricultural development are of 
a more technical nature. There are problems with Zambia's infrastructure. This paper argues that 
these are problems of the provision of public and merit goods mainly occurring in rural areas. 
Farmers emphasize their limited access to resources like credit, fertilizer, and draft animals. 
Although these problems could indicate market failures, it is the view of the authors that they are 
mainly due to transition uncertainties.  2 
1 Introduction 
A broad-based growth has been a major objective throughout Zambia’s post-independence 
era. To achieve this, five policy goals were set out just after independence: i) economic 
diversification, ii) employment creation, iii) removal of regional and sectoral inequalities, iv) 
sustainable internal and external balance, and v) provision of social facilities. The financial base 
for achieving these goals was mineral revenues. Agricultural growth was to play an important 
role, especially with respect to the first two goals. However, three decades of experimenting with 
economic and agricultural policies have failed to stimulate the expected outcome, as many 
resources of the agricultural sector are not fully utilized. The reason for this idling of land is less a 
shortage in the amount of financial resources spent by the government in the agricultural sector,
1 
but rather the allocation of this budget within the sector and the political as well as the 
institutional setting faced by its major players. 
This paper has been prepared as part of the Zambia country study of the Macroeconomic 
and Regional Integration in Southern Africa (MERRISA) project. As such it mainly serves as a 
descriptive starting point for modeling exercises. Figure 1 gives an example of how policies in 
different areas have an impact on the performance of the agricultural sector. This paper focuses 
on analyzing constraints on the development of the agricultural sector in Zambia. It shows that 
certain agricultural goals could not be reached by just changing some rules while at the same time 
neglecting to integrate these changes into the complete institutional setting. There are constraints 
on Zambia's agricultural development that are more technical in nature. On the one hand, there 
are problems in the infrastructure (bad roads and telecommunications system) that are problems 
of the provision of public and merit goods mainly occurring in the rural areas. On the other hand, 
the limited access to resources like credit, fertilizer, and draft animals, emphasized by farmers 
(see Francis et al., 1997, p. 13), could indicate market failures. In our view it is more likely that 
these access problems are due to the uncertain environment of transition (see also Wichern, 
1998).  
                                                            
1 In 1991 for example 12 percent of total domestic expenditure of the central government was spent in the agricultural 
sector. There had been a downward trend in spending from 18 percent in 1980 to 5 percent in 1993, but a high 
proportion was offset by donor support in the past years (see World Bank, 1995a, pp. vii and 43). 3 
















Source: Authors' own presentation. 
Some of the factors influencing Zambia's agricultural development will not be discussed 
in depth here. Influences of macroeconomic policies on agricultural performance are discussed in 
a second paper for the MERRISA project.
2 Another important constraint is the increase in general 
and transition-specific uncertainties, e.g., political continuity and consistency, exchange rate and 
interest rate stability, that potentially restrain economic activity. These constraints will be 
highlighted in a third paper.
3  
                                                            
2 See Chiwele and Hausner (1998). 
3 See Wichern (1998). 
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Section 2 of this paper characterizes Zambia's agricultural sector and discusses major 
technical constraints. Section 3 outlines key issues of the political and economic developments 
over the past three decades. This evolution has had major impacts on the performance of the 
agricultural sector and will help to explain its status quo. Section 4 discusses the major 
impediments to agricultural growth. The final section of this paper gives a short summary and 
raises some issues for further investigation.  
2 Structure of the Agricultural Sector and Constraints to Agricultural Production 
2.1 Structure and Performance of Agriculture 
Agriculture plays an important role in the Zambian economy. The country is endowed 
with abundant arable land resources (Table A1). Four hectares of arable land per capita in 1995 is 
high compared to other African countries. Only a quarter of the available land is used, however, 
and, a five percent calorie balance deficit in the country since the early 1980s indicates the need 
for higher agricultural production (Table A1). Although 60 percent of the population derives its 
livelihood from farming (IAS, 1996, p. 8), the share of agricultural production in GDP stayed 
around 20 to 30 percent in the past years. Half of the total food crop production (maize, millet, 
wheat, and rice) is used for subsistence purposes and seed stocks (IMF, 1997, p. 25). About 75 
percent of the total labor force is employed in the agricultural sector, which is the second largest 
source of formal employment, after public administration. Agricultural GDP growth averaged 
only 1.5 percent annually between 1965 and 1997. 
Exports for most years have been less than 3 percent of GDP, although a significant 
increase occurred in the last ten years, when agricultural exports
4 rose from US$ 9.7 million in 
1988 (excluding processed food: 5.4 million US$) to US$ 107.3 million (US$ 30.8 million) in 
1998. Figures 2 and 3 show the shares and the magnitude of agricultural exports. 
There are three categories of farmers in Zambia. The majority, about 800,000 small-scale 
farmers, farm on average around 1.5 hectares; about half of them are subsistence farmers (Francis 
et al., 1997, pp. 1 and 11). They use simple technologies for cultivation and apply poor farming 
                                                            
4 Including animal products, floricultural products, horticultural products, and primary agricultural commodities. 5 
practices consisting largely of hand hoe cultivation that relies heavily on family labor (CSO, 
1994). There is no significant use of oxen for cultivation and there is little reliance on 
intermediate goods. The only sparely used intermediates are hybrid seed and fertilizer for maize 
production. Small-scale farmers concentrate primarily on food production. 




























































































































































*"Non-traditional" commodities are others than commodities from mining industries, which count 
    for over 90 percent of exports. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 1998; own presentation. 











































































































































Source: Ministry of Finance, 1998; own presentation. 
A second major group consists of about 1,000 large-scale commercial farmers basically 
along the line-of-rail (Southern and Central Provinces) and some in Eastern Province. These 
farmers use modern technology and hired labor. They contribute mainly to the country's cash crop 6 
production. In between is a medium-sized group, around 50,000 farmers, who farm 5-20 hectares, 
often using oxen as draught animals. 
There is a pronounced difference between the traditional and commercial sub-sectors in 
the value of crop output per cultivated hectare. These differences are due to variances in crop 
yields and the mix of crops grown. The commercial sub-sector produces most of the wheat, 80-85 
percent of the soybeans, up to 75 percent of the Virginia Tobacco, 30-35 percent of maize, all of 
the sugarcane and seed maize, and most of the coffee and horticultural crops for export. 
The traditional sub-sector produces most of the sorghum, millet, cassava, groundnuts, and 
mixed beans. The major crop grown by the traditional sub-sector, however, is white maize, 
produced partly from improved hybrids and varieties, and partly from traditional seed. This sub-
sector is characterized by low crop yields with an annual average of only 1.77t/ha for maize 
between 1982/83 and 1993/94 compared to 3.38t/ha for commercial farmers. Yield rates are 
partly determined by variances in rainfall within and between years and in the regional quality of 
land, such as the influence of highly acid soils in the North. Nevertheless, yields are also poor 
because of low usage of modern farm inputs, labor shortages that force farmers to plant late, lack 
of improved technology, and bad farming practices due to insufficient human capital. These 
constraints will be discussed in more detail below. 
In terms of cropping patterns, there is an overwhelming dominance of maize production. 
In 1990 crop production contributed 55.4 percent to total agricultural output. The area cultivated 
with maize is more than 50 percent of that devoted to total crop output. The dominance of maize 
production is a response to the adoption of the pan-territorial and pan-temporal pricing systems 
and to maize-related production and marketing subsidies provided before 1992. In effect, the pan-
territorial pricing system subsidized maize production of small-scale producers in remote areas. 
The share of small-scale farmers in maize production after the mid-1980s rose from 60 percent to 
80 percent. The adoption rate of hybrid maize varieties rose from 30 percent in 1985 to nearly 57 
percent in 1990, "one of the highest adoption rates in East and Southern Africa" (World Bank, 
1995b, p. 32). At the same time, there was a relative shift of maize production away from the line-
of-rail to distant rural areas. The share of Central Province in maize production, for example, 
declined from 38 percent in 1980 to 26 percent in 1990. 7 
Figure 4 shows the development of production and yield of maize in Zambia. An 
increasing production and a decreasing yield in the 1980s implicitly shows that the area for maize 
production increased until 1988. 
Source: MAFF, final crop forecast, several issues. 
2.2 Constraints on Agricultural Production 
The following section discusses several constraints on agricultural production in Zambia. 
Some are of a technical nature, while others are a result of market failures and the lack of public 
goods provision. Policy failures will be discussed in Section 3. 
2.2.1 Credit Markets 
Credit has traditionally been provided through three main agricultural lending institutions: 
Zambia Co-operatives Federation Finance Services (ZCF-FS), Credit Union and Savings 
Association (CUSA) and Lima Bank. These three organizations directed their activities at small-
scale farmers, issuing credit mainly in the form of short-term (seasonal) loans (see Table 1). 
Commercial farmers, who are mostly interested in medium- to long-term loans, obtain their credit 
from commercial banks. 
Although commercial farmers were never directly subsidized through cheap loans, 
negative real interest rates, which prevailed for most part of the period before 1994 as a result of 



















































































































controlled (or fixed) interest rates, effectively meant indirect subsidies for their operations. 
Interest rates slowly moved up from 3.5 percent in 1964 to 4.5 percent in 1974. They were raised 
gradually to 7.3 percent by 1979. A temporary decontrol of interest rates occurred between 1983 
and 1987 under IMF/World Bank reforms that saw the lending rate rise to as much as 35 percent. 
When reforms where abandoned in May 1987, the lending rate was fixed at 15 percent, while the 
inflation rate was hovering around 40 percent. Like most business firms in the country, 
commercial farmers, trying to take advantage of the cheap credit, overexposed themselves to 
borrowing. Consequently, they were caught unprepared for the financial market liberalization 
initiated in 1992. Nominal interest rates rose to as high as 135.1 percent in June of 1993. Most 
commercial farmers suddenly found themselves in financial difficulties as their debt service 
requirements shot up overnight. Real interest rates, however, were still negative, as inflation rates 
stayed between 150 and 200 percent. Figure A1 shows how the high profitability of obtaining a 
loan suddenly changed in 1994. 
Small-scale farmers’ capital investments for intermediate goods and farm improvements 
were constrained by limited access to credit and low farm profitability. Small-scale farmers’ only 
sources of formal credit, ZCF-FS, CUSA, and Lima Bank, provided mainly short-term loans. For 
example, between 1987 and 1990, about 90 percent of Lima Bank loans went to finance crop 
production while only between 1 and 4 percent was lent for machinery and equipment (Kalinda, 
1997). Most credit schemes did not require savings as a prerequisite for obtaining a loan. Thus 
most small-scale farmers did not build up personal capital for investments. Their agricultural 
assets (excluding crop inventories and cash/bank deposits) in the 1980s were estimated at 
US$1,000 per farm household. Cattle accounted for most of this amount, while farm machinery 
accounted for 5 percent. In the commercial sub-sector, farm machinery accounted for 29 percent 
of total assets (IAS, 1996). About 11 percent of the farmers received some type of formal credit 
(IAS, 1996), while about 20 percent had applied for it. The low rate of applicants can be 
interpreted in two ways. Either farmers did not see a chance of receiving a credit, that is, they 
faced problems of an unequal or unfair distribution (collateral was not required in the programs), 
or farmers did not recognize the value of a credit despite the (fixed) negative real interest rate. 9 
Table 1: Distribution of Lima Bank Loans by Type of Loan, 1987-90 
Type of Loan  1987/88  1988/89  19989/90  1990/91 
Short Term 
Medium 













Source: Kalinda (1997) 
Government spent about 20 percent of its agricultural expenditure every year providing 
funds to the agricultural lending institutions. Although these funds were supposed to be paid 
back, the institutions failed to do so because of poor recovery rates. Poor recovery rates resulted 
from poor loan targeting, low levels of profitability among borrowers, and lack of security taken 
for the loans extended. ZCF-FS, CUSA, and Lima Bank, being parastatal organizations, 
particularly suffered from the borrowing attitudes of small-scale farmers. In general, a loan from 
the government was viewed as having the character of a grant. Furthermore, in drought years 
farmers considered the loan as insurance and refused to repay it. The government often tolerated 
this behavior. As part of the on-going reforms, the government announced a freeze on the 
provision of funds for agricultural credit. LIMA Bank was liquidated in February 1997, and ZCF-
Finance Services and CUSA virtually stopped lending to small-scale and emergent farmers. This 
led to the collapse of credit to smallholders, with only 11 percent receiving credit in the 1990s. 
There is evidence that the collapse of credit is having serious effects on the use of inputs 
such as fertilizer and hybrid seeds. However, two positive developments seem to have emerged 
with the demise of traditional credit. First, contract farming emerged from the credit squeeze. It 
has increased for crops such as cotton, tobacco and coffee, which were always covered under 
contract farming. It has also been broadened to include other crops such as maize, soybeans, 
castor oil, paprika, and groundnuts and, in a few cases, sorghum. Most typical contracts involve 
the contractor delivering inputs to the contracted farmer in anticipation of exchange for a 
specified amount of output at harvest. Big contractors such as Lonrho Ltd. also offer extension 
advice as part of the package. It is estimated that various forms of these interlocking transactions 
may cover as many as 30 to 40 percent of small-scale farmers, much higher than the small number 10 
obtaining credit in the 1990s.
5 Unfortunately, the shortage in medium- to long-term credit for 
capital investment (e.g. in irrigation) has not been resolved through contract farming. The second 
benefit is that farmers are forced to make more effective use inputs that might have been over-
used in the past due to cheap credit and subsidized fertilizer sales. Alternative sources of soil 
nutrients, such as animal manure, have seen an increase in use in the 1990s (esp. in the Southern 
Province, see Njobvu/Tembo, 1996). The question arises whether land as a collateral could have 
helped small-scale farmers in obtaining access to credit. It will be discussed in the following 
subsection. 
2.2.2 Land Markets 
In Zambia only 16 percent of the estimated 9 million hectares of cultivable land is 
regularly cropped and only 6 percent of the vast irrigation potential of 2.5 to 3 million hectares is 
used for irrigated agriculture. It thus seems that land as a resource cannot be considered a major 
constraint on further agricultural growth. 
Zambia’s land tenure system classifies land in three categories: State, Reserve, and Trust 
Land (Milimo, 1994). State Land mostly consists of a narrow strip of land along the line of rail, 
50 kilometers on both sides, and a few pockets of land in outlying areas. State Land, named 
Crown Land in the colonial era, was earmarked for European settlers and mining activities. It 
amounts to 3 million hectares and is held on 99-year leasehold. Reserve Land was set aside for 
indigenous people. It was augmented by Trust Land after land degradation was noted on the 
former on account of overcrowding. Both were placed under customary law and are mainly 
referred to as traditional land. They amount to 24 million hectares.
6 
Three factors have constrained the development of land markets in Zambia. First, for fear 
of creating a poor, landless society, the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act was passed in 1975. It 
deemed all land to be without commercial value and non-tradable except for the improvements on 
                                                            
5 However, this development is dependent on the government strengthening the enforcement of the Credit Act. There 
have been numerous cases of farmers reneging on their contracts by selling the produce to other traders and thus 
undermining the viability of the contractors. In our opinion, the interlocking transactions system is a system with high 
transaction costs. A functioning credit market and stable interest rates would certainly make interlocking transactions 
less advantageous. 11 
the land. Trading in land improvements was an important loophole effectively used to trade land 
itself as these improvements were sold at values far in excess of their market value. Nevertheless, 
this provision prevented the establishment of a free land market. Landowners with vast amounts 
of land were prevented from subdividing and selling to others. Even the renting out of land was 
implicitly undermined with land not having any value. If a suitable administrator for surplus land 
belonging to a single owner could not be found, large pieces of land went underdeveloped as the 
owners then preferred to use it for less productive means, e.g. as game area. Hence, because of the 
"no value" constraint, landowners prevented an efficient resource allocation of land as potential 
users were forced to utilize less suitable land. 
Second, as the community owned traditional land, traditional rulers were responsible for 
its allocation. No titles were given to individuals although they possessed free access to its use. 
The traditional ruler would allocate a piece (or pieces) of land for exclusive use to a household, 
e.g. for farming purposes, while leaving the rest for communal use, such as for grazing of animals 
(Milimo, 1994, p. 6). Hence, the individuals received the rights to use (usus) and the rights to 
keep the harvest (usus fructus), but they did not get the whole set of property rights, as they were 
not allowed to change or sell the land (usus abusus). This arrangement proved effective in 
ensuring access to land by almost everyone who settled on traditional land. As the chief received 
gifts from the community members the allocation of the individual land may have been efficient, 
assuming that the value of a gift increased with an increase in the marginal utility of this land to 
the acquiring household. It is possible, however, that this division of property rights made the 
transition from subsistence to commercial farming difficult. As land could not be offered as 
collateral, it was impossible to obtain more than seasonal loans on the basis of land ownership. 
This could explain the low levels of capital assets possessed by small-scale farmers. Some 
studies, however, found that land, as collateral, does not significantly improve agricultural 
productivity.
7 They conclude that the collateral constraint is not binding due to other more 
stringent constraints, such as poor rural health and education, lack of infrastructure, imperfect 
markets for inputs, outputs and risk, and overall low levels of technology. These other factors 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
6 These figures refer to land potentially available for agricultural use and exclude protected forests and land not 
suitable for agriculture such as hills, escarpments, swamps or flooded areas (see MAFF, 1994a). 
7 E.g. Migot-Adholla/Hazell/Blarel/Place, 1993, p. 269ff. for Kenya, Ghana, and Rwanda. 12 
may prevent farmers from higher capital investments. On the one hand land abundance can, in 
principle, facilitate agricultural growth. On the other hand the drawbacks of the low population 
density in Zambia are the high cost and scarcity of infrastructure and marketing facilities, which 
limit agricultural growth prospects. Boserup already made this point in 1969. To date there is no 
empirical study of these issues in Zambia. But it is likely that the predominance of the other 
factors holds for Zambia as well. If so, the allocation of complete property rights by itself will not 
lead to a significant increase in productivity. Due to infrastructure problems large amounts of land 
in Zambia will still be left idle. 
The 1995 Land Act tried to abolish the "no-value" and "communal land" constraints cited 
above. The Act states under Section 4 Paragraph 1 that "from the commencement of this Act, land 
in Zambia shall have value". This declaration has freed landowners to sell their land even without 
any development. Early indications are that the liberalization of the land markets has initiated a 
lot of activity whereby a number of farms are being demarcated and sold. The Act also makes 
provision for people in traditional lands to get leasehold titles to the land they might have 
occupied before the Act was passed. This has to take place in agreement with the traditional 
leader in the area. Persons wishing to migrate to an area demarcated as traditional land could also 
be allocated leasehold titles through the chief. The involvement of traditional leaders is supposed 
to ensure that the reallocation of property rights to applicants will not lead to social unrest of any 
kind. Recent experience indicates that chiefs usually do not allocate more than 250 hectares to 
one single settler. 
Despite the positive elements contained in the 1995 Land Act, any positive impact is 
unlikely unless cumbersome land administration procedures are removed. The land administration 
is centralized in Lusaka, but many government departments have to be consulted. Furthermore, a 
tax on land has to be paid by the owners. The magnitude of this tax is not fixed over time. Hence, 
landowners face an uncertain cost, which will surely make ownership less attractive. A Central 
Statistical Survey indicated that 42.1 percent of small farmers were willing to obtain leasehold 
titles, 68.1 percent of which cited security of tenure to the land as the chief motivation. 
Furthermore, the ground rent for state-owned land is not based on its marginal utility but fixed 
depending on the total amount of land rented and the distance from major cities (see Figure A2).  13 
Thus, unless land administration is decentralized and well coordinated, liberalization of 
the land markets and freeing of traditional land for leasehold will proceed only slowly. In our 
view the shortcomings of Zambia’s land tenure system have little to do with access to land for 
agricultural use. There was and is no constraint on small-scale farming. But the inability to 
provide collateral and motivate holders to invest in land improvements is crucial. The titling of 
land is a precondition for a rise in farm investments such as in irrigation and deep tanks. Such 
improvements would lead to increases in the cultivation of high value crops, in land and animal 
productivity as well as in the total area cultivated. However, the titling itself is not sufficient. 
Other conditions, e.g. infrastructure, education, and market imperfections, need to be improved as 
well. Only if these conditions are fulfilled will changes made to the Land Act have the desired 
implications for agricultural development in Zambia. For public and merit goods it would be the 
duty of the government to secure their provision. 
2.2.3 Labor Constraints 
With scarce intermediate goods provision, potential agricultural output growth becomes 
dependent on increases in agricultural labor supply. Seasonal and other labor bottlenecks are often 
cited as major impediments to agricultural growth in Zambia. With one of the highest 
urbanization figures in Africa (around 50 percent), this seems to be plausible. In our opinion, 
however, low labor productivity is the main problem. Between 1982 and 1994, on small-scale 
farms one farm worker covered on average 0.5 hectares (IAS, 1996, p. 61). This low value 
certainly cannot be attributed to the low level of mechanization (hand-hoe cultivation) only. In 
addition to the quantity constraint, the quality and the organization of labor both seem to 
determine the low percentage of land under cultivation. First, the division of labor between men 
and women is not equal and, most likely, does not reflect comparative advantages. Restrictions 
like "weeding is a female activity" and others are an impediment to increases in labor 
productivity. Second, poor education and the poor health status of the rural population influence 
the quality of labor. Diseases are most prevalent during the rainy season when demand for labor is 
highest (Njobvu, Tembo, and Kabongo, 1995). Furthermore, the prevalence of illness and 
disability is significantly higher in rural areas and the school attendance rate is much lower 14 
(Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, LCMS, 1997)
8. Third, techniques of reducing labor 
scarcity by improving cropping techniques, such as the use of minimum tillage and the shifting of 
activities to another time of the year, are rarely applied. While the latter requires a greater 
diversification of crop production, the former is relatively easy to adopt. In addition, minimum 
tillage not only reduces labor bottlenecks, but it reduces soil evaporation as well. 
With respect to the labor constraint, studies by Keyser (1995) and the World Bank (1995b) 
need attention. Comparing the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) coefficients for small-scale and 
commercial farmers, they point out that small-scale farmers in Zambia are at least as efficient. 
This holds especially for the production of maize, where according to their calculation small-scale 
farmers are even more efficient than their commercial counterparts. Assuming that economic 
prices in the derivation of the DRCs have been calculated correctly, it still needs to be pointed out 
that these prices represent current prices only. Hence, the conclusion that in the medium to long 
term small-scale farmers will stay more efficient seems to be a dangerous one. First of all, the 
measure depends very much on the opportunity costs of labor, which are assumed to be very 
small. If these costs increase, small-scale farms with only 0.5 hectares per worker under 
cultivation will soon become less efficient. Furthermore, recent policy has been aimed at 
increasing agricultural production through a more intensive use of intermediates. But an increase 
of these inputs in small-scale farming will significantly increase DRC coefficients. 
At this point a remark on the statistical data seems to be relevant. The Post Harvest 
Surveys (PHS) show a large portion of farms that crop only one product (often maize) on a single 
plot. If these percentages are correct, farmers are unlikely to be efficient. By cropping a mix of 
products labor peaks could be leveled out, thus increasing efficiency.  
2.2.4 Price and Market Information System 
In early 1993 the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF) initiated the 
Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS). The objective was to improve market 
transparency in support of the arbitrage process and an increase in market integration (MAFF, 
                                                            
8 According to the LCMS Report illness is about 30 percent higher in rural areas and the rate of disabled persons is 
about twice as high as in urban areas. School attendance (age group 14 to 18) is at 54 percent in rural areas compared 
to 65 percent for urban areas. 15 
1995a, p. 7). The AMIS started with the weekly collection of wholesale prices of six major 
commodities and two prices for processed products. A year later a well-organized system of 
collecting and disseminating data covered nearly all district capitals. 
This system, however, could not be sustained over time, with lack of funding cited as the 
reason for its unsustainability. For most locations and for most products the time series of prices 
are incomplete, with the best information available for maize prices at the provincial capitals. 
Besides problems with data collection, its dissemination was less than satisfactory. Radio 
broadcasting was interrupted frequently and dissemination at the local level was reported as 
unreliable. At many places district officers did not hang out the weekly market bulletins on their 
designated notice boards. 
Hence, an agricultural information service has been initiated in Zambia, but it has to be 
improved with respect to the continuity (and institutionalization) of its data provision. Despite the 
initial problems, due to AMIS, the dissemination of market information can no longer be viewed 
as a major impediment to growth. 
2.2.5 Post-Harvest Technologies 
Many farmers sell most of their crop right after harvest. Therefore, it is sometimes argued 
that a lack of on-farm drying and storage capacity is an impediment to agricultural growth. Surely, 
the pan-seasonal pricing policies of the 1970s and 1980s are responsible for on-farm storage 
having no tradition in Zambia. However, as the construction of simple storage facilities is neither 
expensive nor difficult to perform (e.g. MAFF, 1994b; 1996a), there must be other reasons for the 
early selling of the produce, such as liquidity constraints or uncertainty of future market 
developments (see Wichern, 1998). 
2.2.6 Summary 
This section discussed major factors constraining agricultural production, that is, capital, 
labor, land tenure, information and post-harvest technologies. Up to the early 1990s access to 
credit was not a core problem for many producers. The real interest rate was negative and at least 
some small-scale farmers with difficulties obtaining formal credits, more than 10 percent, were 16 
provided with credits through parastatal lending institutions. With a negative real interest rate 
prevailing over many years one can assume that the allocation of credit was sub-optimal and that 
commercial farmers' capital labor ratio was too high. Since 1994, after the liberalization of 
financial markets, real interest rates became positive and improved the incentives for an efficient 
use of credits. However, more recently small-scale farmers have problems obtaining credits as the 
parastatal banks ceased the disbursement of credit to small-scale farmers without collateral. This 
points towards the land market, which is underdeveloped in Zambia. Access to land is not a 
constraint. In most areas the local chief allocates user rights for land. However, farmers seldom 
have a leasehold title and hardly possess the whole set of property rights. This surely constitutes a 
constraint for investing in land improvements and for obtaining credits. In principle, this situation 
was improved by the 1995 Land Act, which allows land to have value and provides the whole set 
of property rights. However, the main constraint to a more intense use of land is the condition of 
the infrastructure in rural areas. An improvement in roads, electricity, water supply, education and 
others would best serve a more efficient usage of the resource land. Labor is often cited as another 
major restriction in crop production. As the area under crop on small-scale farms is 0.5 hectares 
only, we conclude that the more important constraints are rather the quality and the organization 
of labor than its quantity. Education and the health status of the farm workers influence the 
quality of labor. Management skills and social norms influence the organizational aspect. Social 
restrictions, like "weeding is a female activity", should be recognized and – as social transition is 
a rather slow process – eventually be reduced. 
3 Development of Agricultural Policies 
The first part of this section discusses agricultural policies prior to 1991. The main 
elements of government intervention were fixed producer prices, transportation and storage 
subsidies, consumer price subsidies, and subsidies on agricultural inputs and credit. A continuous 
overvaluation of the exchange rate effectively meant a tax on producers of tradable commodities. 
The second part discusses liberalization efforts of the early 1990s, which did lead to a major 
expansion of market forces in the agricultural sector. The government, however, continued its 
involvement in certain key areas with unfavorable, distorting effects on prices, trade, and the 
fiscal deficit. These market interventions, mainly export restrictions, were motivated by the severe 17 
droughts in 1992, 1994, and 1995. Impacts of these policies are discussed in the last section of 
this paper. 
3.1 Agricultural Policies Up to 1991 
The beginning of public interventions in the agricultural sector dates back to colonial 
times. In 1936 the Maize Control Board (later called Grain Marketing Board) was founded. The 
aim of the board was to provide cheap food to the urban population and to keep the real wages in 
the mining industry low (Muyatwa-Sipula, 1993, p. 3). On the producer side, settler farmers along 
the line of rail benefited from having an assured demand for their maize. 
The Rural Agricultural Marketing Board (RAMB) was founded some years later. The 
purpose of this board was the procurement of maize from remote areas in years when the grain 
marketing board could not meet the total demand for maize. 
Both boards stayed in existence after independence in 1964. Holding a monopsony 
position they bought maize and increasingly other products from farmers. The boards set prices, 
but, nevertheless, these prices showed seasonal and regional variances. In 1969 both boards were 
united to form the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBoard). NAMBoard, still 
holding a monopsony position, bought all agricultural products (except cotton, milk, beef, pork, 
and horticultural products) and sold them for the most part to state owned mills and public 
outlets. 
Starting with the 1974/75 season producer prices for maize (fob at the district storage) and 
consumer prices for maize and maize products were fixed at the same level for the whole season 
and for the whole country (Chiwele/Muyatwa-Sipula/Kalinda, 1997, p. 5). In addition to the price 
and procurement guarantee the farmers received seed
9 and fertilizer at subsidized prices. 
Agricultural research and extension was strongly biased towards maize production. 
On the one hand, policy aimed at guaranteeing a higher income to farmers in remote areas. 
On the other hand, the urban population was supposed to receive cheap staple food (60 percent of 
parity price between 1975 and 1985) (IMF 1997, p. 29). Therefore it was unavoidable for the 
government to support the system financially. Huge subsidies went into the marketing of maize 
                                                            
9 The seed was produced by the state-owned firm ZAMSEED. 18 
(e.g. the transport sector, storage by the NAMBoard, and the mills), the state fertilizer sale, the 
seed company (ZAMSEED), and food stamps for the poorest population. These payments rose 
from nominal 54.1 million Kwacha (current US$ 68.5 mill.) in 1976 to 1.4 billion Kwacha (102.3 
mill. US$) in 1988. This not only amounted to an increase of 74 percent in real
10 terms, but 
transfers as a percentage of GDP rose from 2.9 percent to 4.7 percent. 
In principle this pan-territorial pricing favored farmers in remote areas. This holds because 
with fixed prices for producers and consumers the market margin is fixed as well. In a liberal 
economy, however, producers in remote areas get a lower price compared to producers closer to 
market places, because transport and often transaction costs are higher. Hence, their prices would 
be below average if transaction costs were accounted for.
11 
The above holds with regard to the intra-sectoral distribution. But all producers were 
indirectly taxed due to border and exchange rate regulations, which kept producer prices below 
world market prices (see Jansen, 1988, pp. 78; Kalinda, 1997, pp. 26-31; Muyatwa-
Sipula/Hichikumba, 1997, p. 4).
 12 Jansen (1988, pp. 238) calculated the nominal protection rates 
of the basic crops for the years 1966-1984. Table 2 shows that the taxation of maize was strongest 
(besides groundnuts and soybeans). According to Jansen’s calculation the effect of the 
overvaluation of the exchange rate was strongest in the early 1980s. It should be noted that part of 
the "taxation" shown by the negative signs of the NPRs is due to high transaction costs in trading 
and not purely due to high tariffs and overvaluation of the exchange rate. Jansen, in her derivation 
of the NPRs, accounted for transport costs. Domestic whole-sale prices are compared with world 
market prices after dividing the latter by the (equilibrium) exchange rate and adjusting for 
transportation costs to common market places. Nevertheless, transaction costs can be significantly 
higher due to administrative constraints, insufficiently organized public markets, corruption, 
inter-district trade restrictions, limited information systems and the like. Unfortunately, these 
aspects are hard to quantify. 
                                                            
10 Deflated by the CPI. 
11 Conversely the prices for producers which are close to market places would receive a price above the average 
producer price. Consequently these producers are taxed in pan-territorial price setting. 
12 Kalinda showed that past 1984 the direct taxation through the price level was clearly stronger than through the 
overvaluation of the Kwacha. The total taxation rose from 0.49 in 1985 to 0.75 in 1992. 19 
Table 2: Nominal Protection Rates Using Official and (Equilibrium-) Exchange Rates 
for the Years 1966 - 1985 









































































Source: Jansen (1988) pp. 238. 
High financial costs were intensified by agricultural policy measures in the 1980s that 
tried to expand production by increasing producer prices while keeping consumer prices low. 
These price incentives seemed to be successful as yearly increases in production were about 4 
percent between 1983 and 1990 (basically through increases in the area planted). They followed 
yearly increases of 2.1 percent from 1966 to 1974 and 0.3 percent from 1975 to1982. Hence, the 
period with the lowest increase in production coincided with the highest increase in political 
intervention, that is, the period following the introduction of the pan-territorial and pan-seasonal 
pricing system in 1975. In 1982 the government officially allowed economic pricing for 
agricultural output (except for maize, wheat and fertilizer). This meant that a minimum price 
replaced the fixed price. Nevertheless, the introduction of this price policy element did not have 
much of an impact, as the price formation without the minimum price restriction would have led 
to prices well below the minimum price level (Kalinda, 1997, p. 3). 
Figure 5 shows the basic formation of the price for maize and similar for other agricultural 
products during the 1980s. First, as Zambia already was a net importing country for maize, the 
import tariff (15 percent for maize) and non-tariff barriers (e.g. licenses) raised the domestic 
producer prices. However, the relatively high transaction costs of trading kept the producer prices 
much lower. The magnitude of these costs differs from region to region. As discussed above, it 20 
contains much more than the cost of transportation accounted for in the import parity price. Hence 
it is possible that a minimum price is well below the import parity price and still high enough to 
become a fixed price. It is clear that NAMBoard as the main procurer of maize had to cover the 
financial losses. 














free price in remote areas
 
Source: Own presentation. 
Since January 1985, after aid talks with the World Bank, the government has given up 
direct fixing of prices for wheat, soybeans, and sunflower. However, reality has not changed 
much. As a monopsonistic buyer the government still dominated the price determination from the 
demand side. In the mid 1980s a process of concentration took place within the food industry. It 
was initiated by the government, which took over large firms, pushing small firms out of the 
market or hindering their development (World Bank, 1995c, p. 2). These measures led to state 
monopolies and high costs of transaction. 
After these frequent changes of the political and institutional framework, i.e. the "rules of 
the game" (North, 1992), and the frequent redefinition of NAMBoard's objectives, the first 
important steps of liberalization took place at the end of the 1980s. In 1989 NAMBoard was 21 
closed. In passing the Agricultural Marketing Act the market was partly liberalized and the 
producer prices were actually set free, except for maize and fertilizer (see Chiwele/Muyatwa-
Sipula/Kalinda, 1997, p. 6). 
3.2 Agricultural Policy Since 1992 
1991/92 
As indicated above, the agricultural marketing policy up to the early 1990s was 
characterized by strong governmental control and subsidization, with a peak in the years 
following the 1975 macro-economic shocks. Soon after the change in government in November 
1991, fundamental reforms were announced. The financing of the expensive system of 
subsidization (and taxation) of the agricultural sector had become more and more difficult. 
Furthermore, the product marketing and input distribution, largely performed by parastatals, was 
recognized as being inefficient. Shortages of production inputs and a malfunctioning credit 
market became obvious impediments to agricultural production. The new government was 
convinced that a system of fixed prices and subsidization provided wrong incentives and was 
unfavorable for the development of the agricultural sector (Shawa, 1993). This was in line with 
the "neoclassical counterrevolution" of the 1980s, demanding free markets and less government 
intervention (Todaro, 1997, p. 86). Consequently, major institutional reforms were planned 
(World Bank, 1995b, p. 40). They included the following: 
• decontrolling of prices and major reductions of subsidies to provide proper market signals 
and, hence, stimulate a change in the mix of output produced, 
• new monetary and fiscal policies to dampen inflation, 
• market based exchange and interest rates to lower indirect taxation, and 
• privatization of parastatals to improve the efficiency of markets. 
The implementation of these goals, however, was a stepwise undertaking. Restrictions on 
maize marketing were loosened beginning in 1991/92. Maize imports, consumer prices for maize 
and prices for transportation, which were determined by the government until February 1992, 
were liberalized. Producer prices were still determined by a minimum price system. As the 
government gave up fixing the marketing margin, the influence on consumer prices remained 22 
only indirectly. Now, regional and seasonal differences in transaction and transformation costs 
influenced the consumer prices. Especially in deficit regions consumer prices differed 
considerably from producer prices according to the distance and access to market outlets. Hence 
the regional variance increased. The same held true for the seasonal differences, as some regions 
shifted from a surplus to a deficit region within a year and the accessibility of markets varied over 
time (e.g. bad roads conditions in the rainy season). Market integration, in the early stage of price 
liberalization, suffered substantially from limitations in the infrastructure and the institutional 
setup. Bad roads, deficient information dispersion and uncertainties with respect to further 
political decisions, to name but a few, hindered initial liberalization steps from having a broader 
success. 
Liberalization was especially hampered by a major drought in the 1991/92 season, which 
led to huge losses in yields and livestock numbers. Maize imports were highly subsidized by 
several donor countries and by the government. As a result, the consumer prices did not rise as 
the emerging private maize traders expected them to do. The government faced severe budgetary 
problems, which actually increased the pressure to implement reforms. Nevertheless, the drought 
was an exogenous factor that prevented a positive supply response at an early stage of the reform 
process. 
1992/93 
Policymakers argued that the minimum price for maize would increase the domestic 
supply through guaranteed "higher" prices. However, the rising minimum price, which actually 
fixed the producer prices, and the competition with food aid prevented private traders from 
engaging in the maize market. In principle the situation stated in Figure 4 still endured. The 
minimum price set by the government led to losses for the traders, as the market margin did not 
cover the costs of transactions. Since 1992 the government had not fixed consumer prices for 
maize. But potential traders surely considered the risk that the government might intervene again. 
A decrease in consumer prices through food aid reduced the profit margin even further. From a 
producer's point of view the minimum price was still below import parity and was not a real 
stimulus for increased production. 23 
The import tax rates for agricultural products hardly changed in the early 1990s (see Table 
3). A 15-percent tariff rate on wheat was introduced in 1990 and increased to 20 percent in 1993, 
while the rates for coffee and tobacco had been reduced in 1990 (from 100 percent to 50 percent 
and 30 percent, respectively). The rate for coffee was slightly reduced in 1993, but most tariff 
rates for agricultural products increased after 1993. 
Table 3: Import Tariff Rates for Selected Goods (%) 
Period  1984 - 1987    1990 - 1993  1993 - 1996  1997 - 1998 
Product           
Maize  15    15  0  0 
Rice  15    15  20  5 
Wheat  0    15  20  5 
Coffee  100    50  40  25 
Tobacco (+ 125% Ex. Duty)  100    30  30  25 
Cotton  15    15  20  15 
Soybeans  15    15  20  5 
Pesticides  n.a.    15  20  15 
Tractors / Ploughs  n.a.    15  20  15
* 
Irrigation Equipment  n.a.    15  20  15 
Fertilizer / Seed  0    0  0  0 
* for agricultural use 5 percent 
Source: Kalinda (1997), p. 52, and Zambia Revenue Authority, Tariff Manuals from 1975, 1993, 
and 1998. 
The increases in tariff rates up to 1996 were contradictory to the political goal of growth 
through liberalization in general and to the vision of a free trade zone for COMESA member 
countries by the year 2000 in particular (see Mwakijungu/Tembo, 1997). However, the distortions 
of relative prices improved over the years by reducing the taxes on coffee and tobacco and by 
increasing the rates of others. Import sales taxes were the single largest source of revenue for the 
Treasury (16.9 percent) in 1993 (World Bank, 1995a, p. 143). Any reduction had to be 
compensated by other sources of income. 
It has to be considered, however, that the real exchange rates
13 of the Kwacha against the 
SA Rand, the US Dollar and the GB Pound have appreciated since 1991 (Ministry of Finance, 
1998). Therefore, in spite of the increase in the tariff rates, imported products became more 
                                                            
13 Real exchange rates were calculated from nominal exchange rates by use of consumer price indices. Against the 
US$, the British Pound and the South African Rand the Kwacha gained 13, 7 and 74 percent respectively from 1991 
to 1997 (first three quarters). 24 
competitive compared to domestic tradables. The increase in tariff rates was only a small relief 
for the producers and a cost to consumers. According to Kalinda (1997, p. 50) the estimated 
overvaluation increased from 18 percent in 1986 to 98 percent in 1993. Hence, in net terms, the 
imports were implicitly subsidized. 
A 350-million-dollar agricultural program started in November 1992 with assistance of the 
World Bank and other donors. Five policy objectives were to be promoted (IAS, 1996, p. 2; 
MAFF, 1995b, p. 2): 
• achievement of food security on the national and household level, 
• enhancement of income and development, 
• conservation and improvement of the current agricultural resource base, 
• contribution to sustainable development, and 
• intensification of agricultural exports and, hence, of the sectoral contribution to the 
national balance of payments. 
The Agricultural Sector Investment Program (ASIP) was established in order to support 
the liberalization of the agricultural sector. Improvements in the domestic input supply and in the 
marketing of products (on domestic and international markets), economic pricing of goods, the 
reduction of subsidies, and the privatization of state-owned firms were targeted. 
Further liberalization of agricultural markets was targeted in spring of 1993. As a first step 
of the transition a reduction of direct physical interventions into markets by the government was 
planned. It was argued that this should create incentives for producers and traders to increase their 
engagement. However, the liberalization of financial markets was initiated in parallel, leading to a 
huge increase in interest rates. Given their immense credit burden, the government did not believe 
that private traders had the capability to pre-finance their trade and announced public buying 
agents for the procurement of the maize harvest. These buying agents received a credit from the 
government and had to buy the maize at a predetermined price. Again market principles were 
abandoned, leaving no space for market forces to develop. This policy had several drawbacks. 
Apart from not reaching the goal of liberalization, a large portion of the credit was never 
recovered and not all of the credit was used for the procurement of maize. In addition some 25 
farmers were given promissory notes of the government which only could be cashed with a 6 to 
12 months delay (World Bank 1995c, p. 6), leaving producers in a liquidity squeeze. Furthermore, 
the real price for the producers decreased tremendously, as the high inflation was not accounted 
for in the promissory notes. As it had been the objective of the credit to avoid this liquidity 
squeeze, one could talk of an absolute policy failure
14.  
Several lessons can be drawn from the 1992/93 season. First, when changing a certain 
policy it is not useful to start from a partial analytical perspective. The whole set of rules for the 
market participants has to be looked at, to explain the reaction of the market. Second, the path 
dependency of policy changes becomes clear. The liberalization of the financial market led to an 
increase in interest rates and consequently induced the government to stimulate private 
engagement through cheaper credits and fixed prices. Again, market forces were abandoned. 
1993/94 
For many producers the 1993/94 season began with unpaid debts, unsold products or not 
yet cachable promissory notes. Since achievements by many of the buying agents had been 
unsatisfactory the government restricted the buying agents to institutions which had been major 
players in the past (like LIMA Bank, CUSA and ZCF/FS, which had been major creditors to the 
agricultural sector). This was motivated by the desire to give these institutions the chance to 
recover and pay back their outstanding loans. The government announced the total liberalization 
of the maize market, but stuck to minimum producer prices and even introduced fixed into-mill 
prices. This determined the margin between producer prices and into-mill prices. It was the reason 
for private traders to withdraw from the market, because it determined the price of maize for the 
consumers as well. Finally, subsidized grain imports distorted the market at the end of the 
marketing year because of food shortages due to a shorter rainy season. Therefore, the restricted 
engagements of the private traders were rational from an economic point of view. The reform of 
the maize market had been halfhearted so far and did not show any substantial improvement. 
                                                            
14 An absolute policy failure is considered as a failure to reach the objectives set by a policy, while a relative policy 
failure is indicated by reached objectives, but by inefficient means. 26 
Table 4: Governmental Costs for Maize Production and Marketing (1992 - 1996)  
 
Marketing Support (total); of which: 
Mill. US$ 
84,5 
Outstanding Debts from Lending Institutions and Buying Agents  6 
Promissory Notes  33 
Reduced Interest Charges  15 
Subsidy Relief Maize  3 
Subsidy Reserve Stocks  6,5 
Subsidy Reserve Swaps  2,5 
Marketing Credit Revolving Fund (94/95)  4,5 
Marketing Credit Revolving Fund (95/96)  5 
Reserve Operations (95/96)  9 
Production Support (total); of which:  63,5 
Outstanding Debts from Lending Institutions and Buying Agents  40 
Fertilizer Sale  3 
Fertilizer Underpricing  2,5 
Agricultural Credit Management (94/95)  10 
Agricultural Credit Management (95/96)  8 
Source: MAFF (1996b, p. 78ff). According to MAFF the whole support was claimed to be an 
indirect subsidy. 
1994/95 
As of 1993 there had not been any direct subsidization of maize marketing. However, 
there had been financial costs and forgone income for the government through the support of 
production and marketing of maize, which nearly reached 150 million US$ and amounted to 0.9 
percent of GDP (see Table 4). The major part can be considered an indirect subsidy of the 
agricultural sector. Parts of it are lost in the administration of fertilizer sale and credit distribution. 
In the 1994/95 season the minimum price for maize and the exclusive buying agents were 
finally abolished. In spite of a drought in the South, the government did not intervene in the 
market directly. However, a fund was created to provide the traders with credits. 
The ongoing subsidization of agricultural production and marketing might give the false 
impression that the sector as a whole was subsidized. From the producers' point of view strong 
export restrictions (licensing or even bans), which were binding until 1996, substantially 
intervened in the market. The main impediment was an artificially long administrative delay in 
the issuing of license documents. These delays (or even bans) eliminated opportunities for the 
traders to receive higher prices in Malawi or the Shaba Province of the former Zaire. An enhanced 
export to these countries would have made further imports from the South (e.g. Zimbabwe or 27 
South Africa) necessary and would likely have increased domestic prices. Although Zambia was, 
and still is, a net importing country, the export restriction had economic repercussions and added 
to the net taxing of the producers. 
1995/96 
The fertilizer market was still distorted by underpriced state sales from donations and own 
imports in the 1995/96 season. Although the maize market seemed to be on its way towards more 
liberalization, due to the bad harvest the government decided to intervene again. For several 
months in 1996 an export ban for maize and maize meal was implemented, and following its 
lifting the issuing of export licenses were strongly delayed (MAFF, 1996b, pp. 25-31). Although 
Zambia was a net importer of maize in these years, the exports to neighboring deficit countries 
(e.g. Zaire and Malawi) were still appropriate since any deficit could have been leveled out by 
imports from the South. 
1996/97 
Since the beginning of the 1996/97 season the government has held the view that the 
transformation process of the market system towards liberalization has been accomplished 
(Hantuba, 1997). With respect to direct market distortions this seems to be correct. Indirect 
interventions, that is, inflation, interest rates or exchange rates, however, are still disturbing the 
market (see Chiwele/Hausner, 1998, and Wichern, 1998). The strong taxation of agricultural 
producers, as indicated in Figure 9 below, gives further evidence of an incomplete liberalization 
of the market. However, the import parity prices used in the construction of Figure 10 might not 
reflect the high level of the transaction costs discussed above. Table 5 summarizes the domestic 
agricultural market reforms in the 1990s. 28 
Table 5: Summary of Agricultural Market Reforms 
Measure  Decision  Implemen
tation 
Remarks 
Termination of inter-district trade ban    1985  government has monopoly 
for inter-district sales of 
maize 
Permission for private trade in maize and 
fertilizer 
end of the 
1980s 
1990  no notable activities until 
1992 
Decrease in import tariffs    1990  coffee and tobacco 
Increase in import tariffs    1990  wheat 
Subsidized maize imports     1991/92  due to a drought 
Termination of fertilizer subsidies  1990  1992  indirect subsidies until 1996 
Termination of maize meal subsidies and 
no further direct control of consumer 
prices 
1990  1992  increase of small milling 
firms (hammer-mills) 
Import license levy revoked    1992   
Free prices for transportation    1992   
Decrease in import tariffs    1993  maize, coffee, tobacco 
Increase in import tariffs    1993  rice, wheat, cotton, 
soybeans, intermediates 
Free floating of producer prices for maize  end of the 
1980s 
1993  BUT: credits for buying 
agents, if maize bought at 
predetermined prices 
Termination of maize transport subsidies  end of the 
1980s 
1993   
Free floating of the price for sugar  1991  1993  decline in domestic 
consumption 
Continuation of a minimum producer price 
for maize 
  1993/94   
Termination of a minimum producer price 
for maize 
  1994   
      (continued …) 
 29 
(continued …) Measure  Decision  Implemen
tation 
Remarks 
Privatization of the milling industry  1991  1994-96  some firms had been closed 
Privatization of the oil mills  1991  1995   
Privatization of the cotton industry  1991  1995   
Privatization of the sugar industry  1991  1995   
Reintroduction of an export ban for maize 
and maize meal 
  1996  for several months 
Privatization of the milk industry  1991  1996   
Privatization of ZAMSEED  1992  1998?  new competitors 
Privatization of the fertilizer industry   1992  1998?  competitors are dominant 
Source: World Bank, 1995b, p. 7; ZPA, 1997a, b, 1998. 
4 Impacts of Public Interventions in the Agricultural Sector 
The production of maize was relatively free of uncertainties up to the early 1990s due to 
the agricultural policies discussed above. Business and management capabilities played only a 
minor role in farm production. Small-scale farmers, in particular, profited from this situation. 
Their share in marketed production increased from 60 percent to more than 80 percent in the 
1980s. They implicitly were contract farmers of the government, which provided them with seed, 
fertilizer and extension services, guaranteed the procurement, storage, marketing and prices of 
their products, and provided a quasi insurance against bad harvests. Following a drought, farmers 
often did not repay their loans, without having to face any consequences. During the 1970s and 
1980s the fixed price for maize increased relative to other crops (except against millet), making 
maize relatively more favorable (see Figure 6).  
The net taxing of maize production was relatively smaller in less urbanized, remote areas. 
Hence, after 1991 the reduction in maize production was stronger in Southern, Northern, 
Northwestern and Luapula Province, and within these provinces more severe in remote districts. 
The following three graphs show the development of crop shares in Zambia as a whole (Figure 7), 
Northern (Figure 8) and Central Provinces (Figure 9). 30 





































































































































































Source: Data from MAFF, Policy and Planning Division. 
















































































































*For the years 1988, 1991, 1994, and 1996 data was not available; 2-year-averages were used instead. 
Source: MAFF, production data for several years.  
Most striking in recent development is the relative reduction of maize in favor of cassava 
plantings. This is a clear effort of the small-scale farmers to increase their food security, as the 31 
cassava root will be harvested 6 to 24 months after planting and is likely to be available at times 
of potential food shortages.  




























































































*For the years 1988, 1991, 1994, and 1996 data was not available; 2-year-averages were used instead. 
Source: MAFF, production data, several years. 






































































































































*For the years 1988, 1991, 1994, and 1996 data was not available; 2-year-averages were used instead. 
Source: MAFF, production data, several years. 
In Northern Province (Figure 8) the decrease in maize shares in the 1990s was greatest. 
This was basically compensated by an increase in cassava, for which Northern province has a 
favorable climate, as well as in mixed beans, millet, and sorghum. The increase in the production 32 
of the latter three crops contributes to a more drought-resistant production pattern and higher 
protein supply. In Central Province, however, the increase in these crops and the decrease of 
maize was less pronounced (Figure 8). 
The dismissal of the pan-territorial pricing regime for maize depressed producer prices in 
remote areas relative to other regions as the higher transaction costs for the procurement now had 
to be accounted for. In total, the area under maize crop almost doubled from 540,000 hectares in 
1980 to 1.02 million hectares in 1989. The share of more drought-tolerant crops like millet and 
sorghum declined. The yields of maize decreased from an average of 2.55 t/ha (1979 - 1981) to 
1.61 t/ha (1988 - 1990). This is even more relevant considering the subsidies for fertilizer and for 
certified seeds. Zambia ranked fourth on a per hectare base usage of certified seeds in SSA and 
Eastern Africa (behind South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Kenya). The yields, however, were higher in 
many countries (see COMESA, Production and Trade Statistics, 1997). This reduction in 
productivity can be explained partly by the scarcer financial resources of the government, as the 
public supply of inputs was delayed and private traders were not yet involved in input markets. 
Other sectors, like the transportation sector and the processing industry, suffered as well, as 
necessary spare parts and other things were not provided in time by parastatals. 
Facing today's desolate marketing infrastructure it is obvious that the costly policy of the 
past constrained financial resources, which could have been used for investments in infrastructure 
and services. Besides this clear misallocation of resources itself, the policies had a direct negative 
effect on the agricultural sector, as agents were prevented from utilizing comparative advantages. 
Private traders were almost fully ousted from maize marketing activities. As of the late 1990s the 
sector had not recovered. 
Government expenditures on agriculture per se had only a limited impact on sectoral 
growth due to their inadequate intra-sectoral allocation. In the 1980s large sums were spent for 
marketing and trade in "bailing out or subsidizing parastatal losses in the marketing sector" 
(World Bank, 1995a, p. viii). Table A2 in the appendix shows that, between 1990 and 1994, in 
spite of the ongoing reforms more than one third of the expenditure was still used for marketing 
and trade and about 20 percent for agricultural finance. Accordingly, the government focused on 
curing the symptoms of markets that did not function. Instead, it should have focused on 
improving the institutional setting of the market and on providing public and merit goods. Within 33 
the agricultural sector this means particularly the support of research, education, extension, and 
information. For the economy in general improvements in roads and the judiciary system would 
be warranted. 
With these productivity losses the incomes of small-scale farmers fell significantly 
(Knoop/Lodge, 1997, p. 7). Commercial farmers reacted to the net taxing by lowering the share of 
maize on their total land under cultivation from 83 percent in the years 1975-1977 to about 61 
percent a decade later. 
Export restrictions, increased transaction costs (see Wichern, 1998) and monetary 
constraints kept the producer prices even more below the import parity prices than in previous 
years (for the major food crop maize see Figure 10). Several factors led to the drastic increase in 
disparity in 1993. Most obvious is the dismissal of a 15 percent import tax for maize in that year. 
As Zambia is a net importer the import price determines the domestic price. The lifting of the 
import tax makes imports 15 percent cheaper. Hence, the producer price drops relative to the 
import parity price. Furthermore, the liberalization of the financial markets in the same year 
caused a sudden increase in interest rates. This increased the transaction costs of the traders and 
depressed prices. In addition, higher interest rates caused a liquidity squeeze for many producers 
provoking a strong incentive to sell right after harvest. This depressed producer prices 
temporarily. Finally, transport subsidies were dismissed in the same year, leading to an increase in 
transport costs and, consequently, a decrease in producer prices. 
The transaction costs increased through political
15 (frequent changes in trade policies, 
licensing, food aid) and market based uncertainties (volatile prices, uncertain demand), through 
bad roads, weak law enforcement, corruption and underdeveloped markets for information and 
risk. Monetary constraints necessitated by the liberalization of the financial markets, led to a 
strong rise in interest rates (Figure A1 in the Appendix). Hence, the pre-financing costs of trade 
increased, which depressed the prices for producers even further. It is possible that the transaction 
costs of trading are higher than reflected in the calculations of Figure 10, which would close the 
gap between parity price and producer price. 
                                                            
15 In a survey of agricultural traders in 1997, the majority of large-scale traders accounted policy uncertainty as the 
major uncertainty in their business. 34 







































































































































Import parity price Domestic producer price
 
* The import parity price is the c.i.f. price at the nearest port plus transportation and other costs, and a profit  
margin. Both the import parity price and the domestic producer price are computed for Lusaka. 
Source: IMF, 1997, p. 28. 
In the 1980s the narrow fixed market margin between producer and consumer prices 
prevented private traders from participating in agricultural markets. Kydd (1988) argues that the 
fixed margin was the binding constraint. The trade ban on inter-district trade, which was in effect 
up to 1985, was not crucial, as private traders would not have been active with the fixed margin in 
place. The government also influenced the production of cotton, tobacco, soybeans, sunflower, 
and wheat. Because of the numerous market controls, the private sector withdrew from input 
supply, marketing, and processing activities. Sectors with the least state control therefore had the 
highest private marketing activities (floriculture, horticulture, coffee, and chicken). Through 
competition the transaction costs of trading are likely to be smaller than in markets of protected 
goods. 
5 Summary and Conclusions 
In the first section we discussed the structure of the agricultural sector and constraints on 
agricultural production. Up to the early 1990s the access to credit was not a core problem for 
producers. The real interest rate was negative and small-scale farmers with difficulties of 
obtaining formal credits were provided with credits through parastatal lending institutions. With a 35 
negative real interest rate prevailing over years one can assume that the allocation was not optimal 
and that commercial farmers' capital labor ratio was too high. Since 1994, after the liberalization 
of financial markets, real interest rates have become positive and have improved the incentives 
for an efficient credit use. Small-scale farmers, however, have problems obtaining credits as the 
parastatal banks have given up the disbursement of credit to farmers without collateral. This leads 
us to the market for land. In most areas the local chief decides the allocation of the user rights for 
land. Farmers seldom have a leasehold title and hardly ever obtain the whole set of property 
rights. This surely constitutes a constraint for investing in land improvements and for obtaining 
credits. In principle, this situation was improved by the 1995 Land Act, which allows land to have 
value and gives the basis for allocating property rights. However, as we pointed out above, the 
main constraint to a more intense use of land is the limited infrastructure. An improvement in 
roads, electricity, water supply, education and others would best serve a more efficient usage of 
the land resource. Labor is often cited as a major restriction in crop production. As the average 
area under crop on small-scale farms is 0.5 hectares only, we conclude that the actual constraint is 
with respect to the quality and the organization of labor. Education and improvements in the 
health status of farm workers would increase the quality of labor, while better management skills 
and social norms would improve its organizational aspects. 
In the next section we discussed the agricultural policies prior to and post 1991. Up to the 
1990s the main indicators of a strong state intervention were fixed producer and consumer prices, 
transportation and storage subsidies, consumer price subsidies, and subsidies on agricultural 
inputs and credit. The continuous overvaluation of the exchange rate had (and still has) major 
indirect effects, leading to a net taxing of producers of tradable goods. The government was the 
monopsonistic buyer of many agricultural products and private trade in all products was not 
allowed before 1990. Thereafter, due to a government fixed market margin, private traders were 
still kept out of agricultural markets. Major impacts of the ongoing interventions were 
• a high dependency on the government,  
• a bad attitude towards credit repayment,  
• decreasing human capital with respect to i) understanding of economic principles, ii) 
collection and usage of information, iii) cultivation of other crops, and iv) storage,  36 
• diminishing regional market structures and decreasing number of companies.  
Significant liberalization efforts started in the early 1990s. Mainly for budgetary reasons 
the new government aimed at decontrolling prices, decreasing the inflation rate, introducing 
market based exchange and interest rates, and privatizing state owned enterprises. Although it 
was a stepwise undertaking, it initiated a major expansion of market forces in the agricultural 
sector. However, these improvements did not have the desired effects with respect to private 
activities in the market. The government continued its involvement in certain key areas, with 
unfavorable, distorting effects on prices, trade, and the budget. The severe droughts of 1992, 
1994, and 1995 served as reasons for market interventions (mainly export restrictions). In 
addition, in the early stage of liberalization, trading activities and, hence, market integration 
suffered substantially from deficiencies in the infrastructure and the institutional setup. Bad roads, 
deficient information dispersion and uncertainties with respect to further political decisions, to 
name only a few, hindered the first steps towards a freer market regime. The liberalization of the 
financial markets led to an immense increase in interest rates in 1993, which assisted the 
widening of the gap between import parity and producer prices. The biases towards maize 
production favoring remote areas slowly reverted. Domestic prices of alternative crops increased 
relative to maize in the 1990s and the share of maize in total area cropped declined, especially in 
more remote regions. 
We can conclude from the foregone discussion that, most likely, allocative efficiency 
improved in the 1990s. Interest rates are more market based and the adjustment of relative prices 
of agricultural commodities has led to a shift in production shares. These are the positive effects 
of liberalization so far. A significant increase in production and services (trade) has not yet 
occurred, owing to the lack of past and current investments in infrastructure and to the uncertain 
policy environment. These points should be tackled in the near future. A stable and clear policy 
and an improved infrastructure will reduce the transaction costs of trading and will lead to higher 
farm gate prices and a better access to cash crop markets. Only with improvements in these areas 




Table A1: Land Use Pattern (1961 - 1994) and Food Availability (1971 - 1994) in Zambia 














  (`000 hectares) 
Total land area  74,339 74,339 74,339 74,339 74,339 74,339 74,339 
   Agricultural land  34,820 34,918 34,985 35,048 35,164 35,234 35,272 
     land available for cultivation  4,820  4,918  4,985  5,048  5,164  5,234  5,272 
     land used as permanent pasture  30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 
   Forest and hills  30,740 30,390 30,040 29,690 30,000 30,470 32,000 
   Other  8,779  9,031  9,314  9,601  9,175  8,635  7,067 
Agricultural land per capita (in ha)      7.66  6.57  5.46  4.75  4.22 
               
  (Share in total land area; %) 
Agricultural land  46.8  47.0  47.1  47.2  47.3  47.4  47.5 
   land available for cultivation  13.8  14.1  14.3  14.4  14.7  14.9  15.0 
   land used as permanent pasture  86.2  85.9  85.8  85.6  85.3  85.2  85.1 
Forest and hills  41.4  40.9  40.4  39.9  40.4  41.0  43.1 
Other  11.8  12.2  12.5  12.9  12.3  11.6  9.5 
Cultivated area as a percent of 
total land available for cultivation 
  26.8  29.3  23.3  16.1  23.5  22.8 
  Food availability 
Total availability of calories (kcal 
per capita per day)
* 
    2,268  2,249  2,086  2,087  2,083 
of which (percent of total):               
   cereals      64.8  67.6  68.5  67.4  65.1 
   maize      51.2  56.4  59.0  60.6  57.5 
calorie balance (%)
**      3.1  2.2  -5.2  -5.1  -5.3 
*The total availability of calories is computed by adding up the calories from all foods available in the economy using 
the appropriate calorie conversion factor for each food item. The conversion factors are applied to the available 
quantity of each food item (i.e., the sum of production (less seed, cattle feed and waste), net imports and changes in 
stocks). 
**The calorie balance is the percentage deviation of the actual calorie availability from the recommended 
average daily intake for adults (2200 kcal.). 
Sources: FAO (at: http://apps.fao.org/) and IMF, 1997, p. 31. 39 
Table A2: Shares of Expenditures by Sub-Programs 
  Allocation in 1990 - 1994 
(avg. %) 
Allocation in 1995 - 1998 
(projected avg. %)
* 
  GRZ  Donors  GRZ  Donors 
Overall  8.2  3.9  11  8 
Agricultural Training  2.8  1.4  5.7  0 
Agricultural Finance  16.5  21.4  12  26 
Food and Nutrition  0.4  0.1  0  0 
Marketing and Trade  32.2  39.6  5  0 
Standards  0.3  0.5  1.7  0 
New Product Development  0  0  0.5  5 
Food Security Agency  3.7  0  0  0 
Research  5.9  8.2  8.8  9.1 
Farm Power  0.2  0.3  1.7  0 
Irrigation  0.2  0.2  2.1  0 
Extension and Information  14.7  8.4  26.3  19.3 
Lands  3.9  7.3  5.7  12.5 
Animal Production and Health  6.2  4.3  9.7  10 
Fisheries  2.8  2.2  7  2.8 
Policy and Planning  2.1  2.2  2.8  5.9 
Total  100  100  100  100 
*The projected allocation is for the ASIP program. 
Source: World Bank, 1995a, p. 45. 40 
Figure A1: Monthly


































































































































*Yearly data from 1989 until 1993. 
Source: Ministry of Finance (1998) Macroeconomic Indicators, several issues. 
 








































































Source: Information from Ministry of Lands, 1998, and own presentation. 41 
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